On most UNIX® systems, root
has omnipotent power.
This promotes insecurity. If an attacker gained root
on a system, he would have every function at his fingertips. In FreeBSD
there are sysctls which dilute the power of root
, in
order to minimize the damage caused by an attacker. Specifically, one of
these functions is called secure levels
. Similarly,
another function which is present from FreeBSD 4.0 and onward, is a utility
called jail(8). Jail chroots an environment
and sets certain restrictions on processes which are forked within
the jail. For example, a jailed process
cannot affect processes outside the jail,
utilize certain system calls, or inflict any damage on the host
environment.
Jail is becoming the new security
model. People are running potentially vulnerable servers such as
Apache, BIND, and
sendmail within jails, so that if an attacker
gains root
within the jail,
it is only an annoyance, and not a devastation. This article mainly
focuses on the internals (source code) of jail.
For information on how to set up a jail see the handbook entry on jails.
Jail consists of two realms: the userland program, jail(8), and the code implemented within the kernel: the jail(2) system call and associated restrictions. I will be discussing the userland program and then how jail is implemented within the kernel.
The source for the userland jail
is located in /usr/src/usr.sbin/jail
,
consisting of one file, jail.c
. The program
takes these arguments: the path of the jail,
hostname, IP address, and the command to be executed.
In jail.c
, the first thing I would
note is the declaration of an important structure
struct jail j;
which was included from
/usr/include/sys/jail.h
.
The definition of the jail
structure is:
/usr/include/sys/jail.h
:
struct jail {
u_int32_t version;
char *path;
char *hostname;
u_int32_t ip_number;
};
As you can see, there is an entry for each of the arguments passed to the jail(8) program, and indeed, they are set during its execution.
/usr/src/usr.sbin/jail/jail.c
char path[PATH_MAX];
...
if (realpath(argv[0], path) == NULL)
err(1, "realpath: %s", argv[0]);
if (chdir(path) != 0)
err(1, "chdir: %s", path);
memset(&j, 0, sizeof(j));
j.version = 0;
j.path = path;
j.hostname = argv[1];
One of the arguments passed to the jail(8) program is
an IP address with which the jail
can be accessed over the network. jail(8) translates the
IP address given into host byte order and then stores it in
j
(the jail
structure).
/usr/src/usr.sbin/jail/jail.c
:
struct in_addr in;
...
if (inet_aton(argv[2], &in) == 0)
errx(1, "Could not make sense of ip-number: %s", argv[2]);
j.ip_number = ntohl(in.s_addr);
The inet_aton(3) function "interprets the specified
character string as an Internet address, placing the address
into the structure provided." The ip_number
member in the jail
structure is set only
when the IP address placed onto the in
structure by inet_aton(3) is translated into host byte
order by ntohl(3).
Finally, the userland program jails the process. Jail now becomes an imprisoned process itself and then executes the command given using execv(3).
/usr/src/usr.sbin/jail/jail.c
i = jail(&j);
...
if (execv(argv[3], argv + 3) != 0)
err(1, "execv: %s", argv[3]);
As you can see, the jail()
function is
called, and its argument is the jail
structure
which has been filled with the arguments given to the program.
Finally, the program you specify is executed. I will now discuss
how jail is implemented within the
kernel.
We will now be looking at the file
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
. This is
the file where the jail(2) system call, appropriate sysctls,
and networking functions are defined.
In kern_jail.c
, the following
sysctls are defined:
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_jail.c:
int jail_set_hostname_allowed = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, set_hostname_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_set_hostname_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can set their hostnames");
int jail_socket_unixiproute_only = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, socket_unixiproute_only, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_socket_unixiproute_only, 0,
"Processes in jail are limited to creating UNIX/IPv4/route sockets only");
int jail_sysvipc_allowed = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, sysvipc_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_sysvipc_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can use System V IPC primitives");
static int jail_enforce_statfs = 2;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, enforce_statfs, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_enforce_statfs, 0,
"Processes in jail cannot see all mounted file systems");
int jail_allow_raw_sockets = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, allow_raw_sockets, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_allow_raw_sockets, 0,
"Prison root can create raw sockets");
int jail_chflags_allowed = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, chflags_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_chflags_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can alter system file flags");
int jail_mount_allowed = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_mount_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems");
Each of these sysctls can be accessed by the user
through the sysctl(8) program. Throughout the kernel, these
specific sysctls are recognized by their name. For example,
the name of the first sysctl is
security.jail.set_hostname_allowed
.
Like all system calls, the jail(2) system call takes
two arguments, struct thread *td
and
struct jail_args *uap
.
td
is a pointer to the thread
structure which describes the calling thread. In this
context, uap
is a pointer to the structure
in which a pointer to the jail
structure
passed by the userland jail.c
is contained.
When I described the userland program before, you saw that the
jail(2) system call was given a jail
structure as its own argument.
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_jail.c:
/*
* struct jail_args {
* struct jail *jail;
* };
*/
int
jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap)
Therefore, uap->jail
can be used to
access the jail
structure which was passed
to the system call. Next, the system call copies the
jail
structure into kernel space using
the copyin(9) function. copyin(9) takes three arguments:
the address of the data which is to be copied into kernel space,
uap->jail
, where to store it,
j
and the size of the storage. The
jail
structure pointed by
uap->jail
is copied into kernel space and
is stored in another jail
structure,
j
.
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_jail.c:
error = copyin(uap->jail, &j, sizeof(j));
There is another important structure defined in
jail.h
. It is the prison
structure. The prison
structure is used
exclusively within kernel space. Here is the definition of the
prison
structure.
/usr/include/sys/jail.h
:
struct prison {
LIST_ENTRY(prison) pr_list; /* (a) all prisons */
int pr_id; /* (c) prison id */
int pr_ref; /* (p) refcount */
char pr_path[MAXPATHLEN]; /* (c) chroot path */
struct vnode *pr_root; /* (c) vnode to rdir */
char pr_host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; /* (p) jail hostname */
u_int32_t pr_ip; /* (c) ip addr host */
void *pr_linux; /* (p) linux abi */
int pr_securelevel; /* (p) securelevel */
struct task pr_task; /* (d) destroy task */
struct mtx pr_mtx;
void **pr_slots; /* (p) additional data */
};
The jail(2) system call then allocates memory for
a prison
structure and copies data between
the jail
and prison
structure.
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
:
MALLOC(pr, struct prison *, sizeof(*pr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
...
error = copyinstr(j.path, &pr->pr_path, sizeof(pr->pr_path), 0);
if (error)
goto e_killmtx;
...
error = copyinstr(j.hostname, &pr->pr_host, sizeof(pr->pr_host), 0);
if (error)
goto e_dropvnref;
pr->pr_ip = j.ip_number;
Next, we will discuss another important system call jail_attach(2), which implements the function to put a process into the jail.
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
:
/*
* struct jail_attach_args {
* int jid;
* };
*/
int
jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap)
This system call makes the changes that can distinguish a jailed process from those unjailed ones. To understand what jail_attach(2) does for us, certain background information is needed.
On FreeBSD, each kernel visible thread is identified by its
thread
structure, while the processes are
described by their proc
structures. You can
find the definitions of the thread
and
proc
structure in
/usr/include/sys/proc.h
.
For example, the td
argument in any system
call is actually a pointer to the calling thread's
thread
structure, as stated before.
The td_proc
member in the
thread
structure pointed by td
is a pointer to the proc
structure which
represents the process that contains the thread represented by
td
. The proc
structure
contains members which can describe the owner's
identity(p_ucred
), the process resource
limits(p_limit
), and so on. In the
ucred
structure pointed by
p_ucred
member in the proc
structure, there is a pointer to the prison
structure(cr_prison
).
/usr/include/sys/proc.h:
struct thread { ... struct proc *td_proc; ... }; struct proc { ... struct ucred *p_ucred; ... };/usr/include/sys/ucred.h
struct ucred { ... struct prison *cr_prison; ... };
In kern_jail.c
, the function
jail()
then calls function
jail_attach()
with a given jid
.
And jail_attach()
calls function
change_root()
to change the root directory of the
calling process. The jail_attach()
then creates
a new ucred
structure, and attaches the newly
created ucred
structure to the calling process
after it has successfully attached the prison
structure to the ucred
structure. From then on,
the calling process is recognized as jailed. When the kernel routine
jailed()
is called in the kernel with the newly
created ucred
structure as its argument, it
returns 1 to tell that the credential is connected
with a jail. The public ancestor process
of all the process forked within the jail,
is the process which runs jail(8), as it calls the
jail(2) system call. When a program is executed through
execve(2), it inherits the jailed property of its parent's
ucred
structure, therefore it has a jailed
ucred
structure.
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
int
jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap)
{
...
struct jail_attach_args jaa;
...
error = jail_attach(td, &jaa);
if (error)
goto e_dropprref;
...
}
int
jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap)
{
struct proc *p;
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
struct prison *pr;
...
p = td->td_proc;
...
pr = prison_find(uap->jid);
...
change_root(pr->pr_root, td);
...
newcred->cr_prison = pr;
p->p_ucred = newcred;
...
}
When a process is forked from its parent process, the
fork(2) system call uses crhold()
to
maintain the credential for the newly forked process. It inherently
keep the newly forked child's credential consistent with its parent,
so the child process is also jailed.
/usr/src/sys/kern/kern_fork.c
:
p2->p_ucred = crhold(td->td_ucred);
...
td2->td_ucred = crhold(p2->p_ucred);
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